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IT IS TIME TO MOVE BEYOND THE ‘AI RACE’ 
NARRATIVE: WHY INVESTMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MUST WIN 
THE DAY 
Kimberly A. Houser* and Anjanette H. Raymond** 
ABSTRACT—The United States has entered into technology races before, 
often with great success, for example, the moon landing. Yet, most of these 
successes were accomplished with local knowledge, even if the impact was 
global. Fifth Generation Cellular Wireless (5G), the Internet of Things (IoT), 
and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are simply incapable of being fully cultivated 
in the same local environment; thus, we must understand these technologies 
within the context of a global community. However, current U.S. policy and 
the absence of cooperation amongst countries are leaving the technology 
ecosystem to operate in a competitive, war-like environment. 5G, IoT, and 
AI—as part of a highly connected digital community—demand we consider 
each within a critical infrastructure framework, focusing on its place in a 
global environment. To accomplish this, we must think in cooperative 
mindsets, with a focus of investment, frameworks, and communities of trust, 
which create and progress ideas for the betterment of mankind. 
 This paper seeks to explore how the current AI race paradigm must be 
discarded and the necessary changes needed to create a framework to 
advance the responsible development of AI. Focusing on the immediate and 
long term needs of the technology ecosystem, with an emphasis on 
cooperation in investment and standards, the paper will explain the 
importance of 5G and AI in the context of global communications; will then 
explain why coordinated investment and standards are necessary; will return 
the focus to ethical considerations with global communities as key 
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stakeholders; and will finally set out a brief series of recommendations for 
immediate and long term investment and guidelines. 
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMBRACING A TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEM 
According to Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum 
held each year in Davos, Switzerland, and the author of The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution. 
Simply put, the Fourth Industrial Revolution refers to how technologies 
like artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and the internet of things are 
merging with humans’ physical lives. Think of voice-activated assistants, 
facial ID recognition or digital health-care sensors.1 
The first revolution utilized steam power, the second electrical power, 
and the third digital power. These advances quickly changed society to allow 
mass production, mass technological development, and mass communication 
and processing.2 The fourth revolution is different from the previous three in 
that it will impact all disciplines, economies, and industries.3 As 
governments have come to realize the potential of this nascent technology, 
each has taken a different path in an effort to achieve supremacy in this field. 
This paper will examine how the difference in law and policy will affect the 
future of Artificial Intelligence (AI) development and why the U.S., EU, and 
China are wrangling over Fifth Generation Cellular Wireless (5G) 
technology. 
 
 1 Elizabeth Schulze, Everything You Need to Know About the Fourth Industrial Revolution, CNBC 
(Jan. 22, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/fourth-industrial-revolution-explained-
davos-2019.html [https://perma.cc/AJZ8-H583] (referring to a speech made by Klaus Schwab at the 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 2019). 
 2 Id. The fourth revolution is just beginning. AI is still in the very early stages, which means it can 
still be shaped and guided. 
 3 See KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1–3 (1st ed. 2017). 
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The potential uses for AI are enormous, for both commercial and social 
good; however, the lack of a coordinated strategy and funding as well as the 
dearth of technical expertise in the U.S. government is already harming this 
field.4 While conflicting reports indicate that the U.S. is winning the AI race 
one day with the EU5 or China the next,6 the future of AI depends on 
cooperation, infrastructure, and uniform standards.7 The major players in AI 
are the U.S., the EU, and China, who have begun to disengage from one 
another due to a variety of factors. This split jeopardizes progress in all 
regions but will have the ultimate effect of reducing the U.S.’s position as a 
global tech innovation leader, which will have long term effects in the rest 
of the world.8 
The reason for the notable advances in AI stem from the recent 
availability of big data and cloud computing. Because previously large data 
sets could not be processed on a single server, and so very few companies 
owned servers large enough to perform big data analytics (think Watson), 
progress occurred in fits and starts. As new technologies are developed and 
implemented, data transfer and processing speeds will be increased9 and 
latency will be decreased,10 resulting in an exponential increase in AI 
capability. As such, the future of AI, especially the Internet of Things (IoT), 
relies on the development and implementation of ancillary technologies such 
as 5G telecommunications networks.11 IoT is the connection of devices, such 
as self-driving cars, that communicate over such networks. Unfortunately, 
 
 4 See AI Policy – United States, FUTURE OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-policy-united-
states/ [https://perma.cc/U4SA-PPXT]. 
 5 Daniel Castro et al., Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?, CTR. FOR 
DATA INNOVATION (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/08/who-is-winning-the-ai-
race-china-the-eu-or-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/4LD4-6BBZ]. 
 6 Heather Long, In Davos, U.S. Executives Warn that China Is Winning the AI Race, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 23, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/01/23/davos-us-executives-
warn-that-china-is-winning-ai-race/ [https://perma.cc/YE4V-BSQR]. 
 7 See infra Part III. 
 8 The Editorial Board, US-China Trade War Risks Global Technology Split, FIN. TIMES: THE FT 
VIEW (June 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0e6c322e-8c4e-11e9-a1c1-51bf8f989972 
[https://perma.cc/VSF4-3L5U]. 
 9 See, e.g., RMIT Univ., New Technology to Allow 100-Times-Faster Internet, EUREKALERT! (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2018-10/ru-ntt102318.php [https://perma.cc/63G2-
P2LL] (discussing improvements to speed that can be made with orbital angular momentum and quantum 
computing). 
 10 Latency is the time delay between the input and output of a system (time between when the 
instruction is given and the transfer of data occurs). Tim Hwang, Computational Power and the Social 
Impact of Artificial Intelligence 9 (Mar. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (SSRN), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147971 [https://perma.cc/KZ3U-JD8K]. 
 11 See generally Rizwan Ahmed et al., Comprehensive Survey of Key Technologies Enabling 5G-
IoT, 2D INT’L CONF. ON ADVANCED COMPUTING AND SOFTWARE ENG’G, Apr. 11, 2019, at 488, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3351007# [https://perma.cc/M4KQ-RCA3]. 
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the U.S. failure of policy with respect to 5G technology will force it to take 
a back seat to China and the EU, who will be instrumental in setting standards 
for this required infrastructure and potentially building this infrastructure in 
the rest of the world.12 
Although the U.S. has superiority in the type of chips needed for 5G, 
China and the EU produce most of the networking equipment necessary for 
its installation.13 As part of China’s long term plan for becoming a world 
leader in technological innovation, it has created an environment supportive 
of industries underlying this goal, such as its 5G network manufacturers.14 In 
addition to a failure to support the telecommunications industry, the U.S. has 
further hindered the future of 5G with the initiation of a trade war preventing 
needed components for this infrastructure to be sourced from China. 
American companies are also harmed by the inability to sell their chips to 
banned entities in China due to recent U.S. restrictions on trade.15 The EU is 
also in an unfortunate position due to the U.S.’s warning that if the EU 
employs Chinese components in its infrastructure, it will withhold 
intelligence from these countries. This lack of cooperation is a relatively new 
event that has not been fully explored with respect to AI. 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding how and if technology may be 
shared, the U.S., the EU, and China are all moving forward independently 
with their AI plans, preventing agreement on standards for equipment and 
processes.16 This move away from cooperation has the potential to not only 
 
 12 Components for 4G telecommunications equipment made by European manufacturers are not 
interchangeable with those made in China. Should 5G be created on different sets of standards, depending 
on where the components originate, countries will need to choose whether to go with European, 
American, or Chinese manufacturers. Kimberly A. Houser, The Innovation Winter Is Coming: How the 
U.S.-China Trade War Endangers the World, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 549, 608 (2020). 
 13 See Thomas Duesterberg, Problems and Prospects for 5G Deployment in the United States, 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019, 4:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2019/04/30/problems-and-prospects-for-5g-
deployment-in-the-united-states/#22098ca2312e [https://perma.cc/8NKW-WL2H]. China currently 
relies on computer chips made with advanced U.S. technology, but new U.S. government restrictions 
have forced it to seek to reduce this dependence by partnering with chip makers closer to home. 
 14 See GREGORY C. ALLEN, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S AI STRATEGY: 
CLUES TO CHINESE STRATEGIC THINKING ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 12 
(2019), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Understanding-Chinas-AI-
Strategy-Gregory-C.-Allen-FINAL-2.15.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R23V-HNSS]. 
 15 Don Clark, Trade War Has Damaged U.S. Chip Industry in Ways a Deal May Never Fix, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/technology/trade-war-chipmakers.html 
[https://perma.cc/BES7-MJ3H]. 
 16 Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World, 
BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-
transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/2R93-GXXE] (“According to a McKinsey Global Institute 
study, nations that promote open data sources and data sharing are the ones most likely to see AI 
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delay advances in AI that would benefit society, but may actually encourage 
uses that are incompatible with a free and safe world.17 While the EU is 
actively seeking to establish ground rules, the U.S. and China are each 
seeking to assert dominance over the other. Despite the potential societal and 
commercial benefits that AI can bring, scholars have noted the dangers that 
could occur without appropriate safeguards for society. Racing to win will 
circumvent these needed considerations. 
II. COORDINATED INVESTMENT AND REGULATION ARE NECESSARY 
The U.S., the EU, and China have significantly differing legal systems, 
especially in terms of privacy and data security regulations. Behind these 
legal systems are divergent ideologies. While the U.S. has a more open 
society, the EU carefully guards personal information. In China, there is 
culturally a lower expectation of privacy. In addition, governments and 
private industry are seeking to move AI forward, some in concert and others 
at odds. The governments in each of these regions have set forth plans on the 
future of AI, but they are taking widely divergent avenues. In addition, each 
region has its own advantage in terms of talent, technology, funding, and 
hardware; but they are no longer working together, which will affect the 
building of the infrastructure needed for widespread adoption of AI, 
especially IoTs. 
As such, this Part will explore the need to regulate both AI and IoT 
within a cooperative framework, with enhanced investment as a necessary 
element of the cooperative technology ecosystem. 
A. Regulation of AI/IoT Is Essential 
Despite the widespread knowledge that data is essential to the 
advancement and improvement of artificial intelligence, few countries, 
outside of the EU, actively regulate data with an eye toward its use. Instead, 
a hodgepodge of regulation, uncoordinated and unimaginative, drive data 
regulation into the realm of privacy-focused, limited-protection, siloed 
regulation. 
 
advances. . . . The key to getting the most out of AI is having a ‘data-friendly ecosystem with unified 
standards and cross-platform sharing.’”). 
 17 See, e.g., Steven Feldstein, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Repression: Global Challenges to 
Governance 1 (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished conference paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374575 
[https://perma.cc/5V52-QCDL] (“To counter the spread of high-tech repression abroad, as well as 
potential abuses at home, policy makers in democratic states must think seriously about how to mitigate 
harms and to shape better practices.”). 
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This Subsection will focus on the various data protection laws that are 
in existence, or that are significantly lacking, and the impact upon the other 
world actors. 
1. Data Is the Fuel that Makes AI Possible 
Data is the fuel on which AI runs. There are two aspects to data use for 
AI. The first is the amount of data available. The second is the legal structure 
around the use of data for AI. With 1.418 billion people, China has the 
distinct advantage of access to the largest data sets in the world.18 The EU’s 
population is 446 million, while the U.S. population sits at 328 million.19 
Developments in image recognition, voice recognition, self-driving cars, and 
predictive analytics would not be possible without access to big data20 and 
the computer power to analyze the data.21 However, each of these three 
blocks addresses the use of data very differently. In the U.S., data protection 
laws are very narrow and out of date, which gives its private industry an 
advantage with much looser restrictions on how it can use this data.22 The 
EU’s regulatory focus is on AI’s impact on human rights. Its stringent data 
protection laws have stifled the growth of its tech industry due to these 
constraints.23 However, it provides the most privacy and data security 
protections to its citizens. Because of its population size, China has access to 
the largest data sets and, due to firewall-type restrictions, has for the most 
part been able to keep the U.S. and EU from gaining access to this data.24 
 
 18 China Population, WORLDOMETER, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-
population/ [https://perma.cc/DW58-U3J3]. 
 19 Living in the EU, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en 
[https://perma.cc/YMQ6-SAHE]. 
 20 This data comes from your online interactions, filling out forms, conducting searches, sending 
emails, purchasing from online stores, and the location data from your mobile device. Many electronic 
devices connected to the Internet that make your life easier are collecting your data. Bernard Marr, How 
Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 
21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-
create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/#559b8ddb60ba 
[https://perma.cc/F9UV-67BQ]. 
 21 See Ashmeet Kaur Duggal & Meenu Dave, Improving File Accessing Efficiency and Cloud 
Storage Performance - A Review, 3D INT’L CONF. ON INTERNET OF THINGS AND CONNECTED TECHS., 
Apr. 27, 2018, at 578, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170184 [https://perma.cc/3L95-JKZD]. Advancements 
in the ability of chips to store and process data relies on the ability to cram more data into smaller 
components. The next advance, due to the Internet, is the ability to store and process data offsite, known 
as cloud storage, where users can access their data through the Internet. Cloud storage allows individuals 
and companies to store their data in a warehouse full of servers rather than on one’s own servers or 
computers. 
 22 See infra Section II.A.1.a. 
 23 See infra Section II.A.1.b. 
 24 See Wei Chun Chew, How It Works: Great Firewall of China, MEDIUM (May 1, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@chewweichun/how-it-works-great-firewall-of-china-c0ef16454475 
[https://perma.cc/W56R-U58V]. 
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While China has created innovation-inducing governmental policies and has 
few restrictions on the government’s use of data, private industry is 
somewhat hampered by governmental control over its use of data and the 
trajectory of the development of AI.25 In terms of actual data sets, the U.S. 
may have the advantage with self-driving car training sets due to the 
availability of labeled roads and maps, but China leads with medical data 
sets because of the looser restrictions on the use of health data there.26 
In addition to China’s population size, its population’s adoption of 
mobile electronic devices is far superior to that in the U.S. or the EU.27 The 
reliance of the Chinese on their cell phones is a treasure trove for data 
collection (location, camera images, and payment activities). Because data 
collection and surveillance are socially acceptable in China, billions of data 
points can be publicly collected, which has given China an advantage in 
advancing AI facial and speech recognition.28 In the U.S., surveillance is kept 
secret and the public seems mostly unaware of the government’s data 
collection activities.29 While most attention is focused on private 
corporations, such as Facebook’s data collection and processing activities, 
most in the U.S. ignore the government’s activities in this regard as well as 
its close relationship with Palantir.30 In the EU, surveillance varies widely, 
 
 25 See infra Section II.A.1.c. 
 26 See Phred Dvorak, Which Country Is Winning the AI Race—the U.S. or China?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
12, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/which-country-is-winning-the-ai-racethe-u-s-or-
china-1542039357 [https://perma.cc/93BR-EJ5Q]. 
 27 See Bill Snyder, Who Is Winning the Artificial Intelligence Race?, STAN. ENG’G (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/who-winning-artificial-intelligence-race 
[https://perma.cc/TKC7-M3E9]. 
 28 See Sarah O’Meara, Will China Lead the World in AI by 2030?, NATURE (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02360-7 [https://perma.cc/AYA2-B42H]. 
 29 See David Carroll, China Embraces Its Surveillance State. The US Pretends It Doesn’t Have One, 
QUARTZ (July 23, 2019), https://qz.com/1670686/the-us-has-a-lot-in-common-with-chinas-surveillance-
state/ [https://perma.cc/UU4Q-ZEZ4]. The EU has expressed concern with U.S. intelligence surveillance. 
In July 2019, the European Court of Justice considered whether the U.S. could be considered lacking in 
adequate privacy protections as required by the GDPR. The court previously struck down the Safe Harbor 
agreement which permitted data transfers between the U.S. and EU due to Snowden’s disclosure of mass 
government surveillance by the U.S. See Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, The European 
Commission on the Privacy Shield: All Bark and No Bite?, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y: TIMELY TECH 
(Dec. 20, 2018), http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/the-european-commission-on-the-privacy-shield-all-
bark-and-no-bite/ [https://perma.cc/PX5L-ZFZP]. 
 30 Palantir has contracts worth over $1.5 billion with the U.S. government. Palantir conducts data 
mining and analysis for the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Internal Revenue Service. Palantir’s work with 
ICE has been labeled “militarized spyware.” See MIJENTE, THE WAR AGAINST IMMIGRANTS: TRUMP’S 
TECH TOOLS POWERED BY PALANTIR 4 (2019), https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Mijente-
The-War-Against-Immigrants_-Trumps-Tech-Tools-Powered-by-Palantir_.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHU3-
C54D]; see also Michael Tennant, IRS Becoming Big Brother with $99-Million Supercomputer, NEW 
AM. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/item/31263-irs-becoming-big-
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with the UK utilizing CCTV on just about every street corner,31 and Germany 
having extreme restrictions on data collection.32 Although the EU notes that 
any type of surveillance impacts important human rights, such as those to 
privacy and data protection, it also acknowledges the need for such activities 
for national safety.33 
The basis of many countries’ data protection regimes stems from the 
“Fair Information Practices” incorporated by the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980 into the Guidelines on the 
Protection and Transborder Flow of Personal Data (the “Guidelines”).34 
Although the U.S. and the EU are both part of the OECD, China is not a 
member, but it has had a working relationship with the OECD since 1995.35 
In terms of the development of privacy law, many countries in Europe 
closely tracked the Guidelines in their own regulations, but privacy laws 
were harmonized for the EU with Directive 95/46/EC in 1995, which was 
replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018.36 The 
U.S. on the other hand, although initially a leader in privacy protections in 
the 1980s, has failed to update its data privacy and security regulations.37 
 
brother-with-99-million-supercomputer [https://perma.cc/M5R4-SLPN]; Kimberly A. Houser & Debra 
Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know 
It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2017). 
 31 Jess Young, A History of CCTV Surveillance in Britain, SWNS (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://stories.swns.com/news/history-cctv-surveillance-britain-93449/ [https://perma.cc/52FR-B5KL]. 
 32 According to the GDPR, in the EU, personal data includes any data that identifies or could identify 
a person. For example, images obtained through video surveillance would qualify as personal data and 
be subject to this regulation, which provides certain rights (of access and control). Video-Surveillance, 
EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/reference-
library/video-surveillance_en [https://perma.cc/43JT-7F9C]; Germany: Land of Data Protection and 
Security – But Why?, DOTMAGAZINE (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.dotmagazine.online/issues/security/germany-land-of-data-protection-and-security-but-why 
[https://perma.cc/ZV9Z-6TQY]. 
 33 2 EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., SURVEILLANCE BY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS AND REMEDIES IN THE EU (2017), 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-surveillance-intelligence-services-vol-
2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WCU-C9CP]. For additional information on U.S. and EU government 
surveillance activities, see Joel R. Reidenberg, The Data Surveillance State in the United States and 
Europe, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 583 (2014). 
 34 Susan Landau, Control Use of Data to Protect Privacy, 347 SCIENCE 504 (2015). 
 35 In 2007, the OECD adopted a resolution to include China in a program of enhanced engagement, 
which could potentially lead to membership in the future. China and the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. 
& DEV. [OECD], http://www.oecd.org/china/china-and-oecd.htm [https://perma.cc/7HW5-BSUV]. 
 36 Commission Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 37 The current U.S. model is often characterized as a “consumer protection model,” as contrasted 
with the EU’s “data protection” model, “specifically designed from the outset to protect individual 
privacy or data security.” WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 257 (2016), 
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Privacy and data protection laws impact the development of AI because they 
limit what companies and governments can collect from people and what 
they can do with such data.38 The following subpart explains how these 
regulations differ. 
a. U.S. Data Protection Laws 
Because of the U.S.’s focus on freedom of speech and disclosures in the 
public interest, privacy protections are fairly insignificant there.39 Not only 
does the U.S. Constitution fail to mention privacy in the Bill of Rights, it was 
not until the late 19th century that invasion of privacy was established as a 
cause of action.40 With respect to personal data, the law only applies to 
specific industries and covers only certain categories of information, such as 
financial,41 medical,42 and children’s data.43 The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) is the agency designated to enforce these data protection laws under 
its mandate to address “unfair and deceptive trade practices.”44 While the 
Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the government’s use of data, there is no 
similar overarching privacy regulation that applies to private industry, and 
few cases are ever brought against the U.S. government for its massive data 
collection activities.45 The main concerns for companies in the U.S. are state 
laws governing everything from data breaches to California’s Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA).46 The CCPA requires that certain for-profit entities that 
collect and process personal data from California residents must provide 
consumers with more control over their personal data, including (1) how data 
will be used, (2) the right to opt out of sharing with third parties, and (3) the 
right to request deletion of their data.47 This can impact companies collecting 
 
cited in W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive 
Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 294 n.24 (2019). 
 38 See generally Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook 
or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2018). 
 39 See Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1041, 1046–47 (2013). 
 40 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193–95 
(1890). 
 41 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
 42 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936. 
 43 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502. 
 44 See Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-privacy-and-identity 
[https://perma.cc/T7XU-BPGN] (explaining the responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission as they 
relate to privacy breaches under Section 5 of the FTC Act). 
 45 See, e.g., Houser & Sanders, supra note 30 (detailing how one U.S. government agency 
circumvents federal law on privacy). 
 46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2018). 
 47 Id. § 1798.140(c). 
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data to use for training AI programs.48 Although other states are now 
considering data protection laws similar to California’s,49 the virtually 
unregulated use of data in the U.S. by private industry has allowed 
companies there to significantly advance developments in AI.50 This, 
however, is not the case in the EU.51 
b. EU Data Protection Laws 
The EU’s robust data protection laws stem from its Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union which provides that: “Everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”52 
While the U.S. protects specific types of data, the GDPR in the EU covers 
“personal data” as a whole, which includes any identified or identifiable 
information about an individual.53 The GDPR expands the definition found 
in its predecessor, the Directive 95/46/EU, of “personal data” by adding 
genetic identity and GPS data: 
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(“data subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a 
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one 
 
 48 This regulation will require much more attention to the collection and processing of consumer 
data, and, depending on how the CCPA is interpreted, may prevent or severely limit the use of consumer 
data for AI use. Chris Ott, Destination Unknown: The Perilous Future of Blockchain and Artificial 
Intelligence Technologies Under the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, UCLA L. REV.: L. MEETS 
WORLD (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.uclalawreview.org/destination-unknown-the-perilous-future-of-
blockchain-and-artificial-intelligence-technologies-under-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/UG47-826V]. 
 49 Odia Kagan, Multiple States Considering New Data Privacy Legislation, FOX ROTHSCHILD: PRIV. 
COMPLIANCE & DATA SEC. (Feb. 10, 2019), 
https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2019/02/articles/california-consumer-privacy-act/multiple-states-
considering-new-data-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/X989-4JMG]. 
 50 Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 106, 160–61 (2019). 
 51 Eline Chivot & Daniel Castro, The EU Needs to Reform the GDPR to Remain Competitive in the 
Algorithmic Economy, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/05/the-eu-needs-to-reform-the-gdpr-to-remain-competitive-in-
the-algorithmic-economy/ [https://perma.cc/AK6M-FRS5]. 
 52 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8(1), Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1. The European Convention for Human Rights (which includes among its contracting parties all of the 
EU member states) also provides a right to respect for private and family life in Article 8. Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 53 The original definition of “personal data” comes from the 1995 Directive, which was repealed and 
replaced by the GDPR on May 25, 2018. GDPR, supra note 36, arts. 99(2), 94(1); Directive 95/46/EC, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31, 38 [hereinafter 95 Directive]. 
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or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person[.]54 
The GDPR became applicable May 25, 2018, and consists of ninety-
nine articles addressing data collection, maintenance, and use. The main 
thrust of this regulation is the ability to give users control over how 
information about them is used. Most uses require voluntary, explicit consent 
by the data subject.55 The EU data regime has more in common with China 
than with the U.S. with respect to regulations regarding the collection and 
use of personal data by private industry, and although U.S. companies 
currently have the ability to access data from the EU through the Privacy 
Shield,56 signs indicate that the EU is starting to crack down on practices that 
do not align with the GDPR, tax law, and antitrust law.57 Google was recently 
fined €1.5 billion for violating EU antitrust laws.58 Similar to the CCPA, the 
GDPR gives rights to subjects as to how their data is used. However, Article 
22 also permits subjects to opt out of automated decision-making that 
“produces legal effects or significantly affects the data subject.”59 Although 
there have not been any court actions on this right with respect to AI, scholars 
have indicated that because the wording of this provision is unclear, the 
precise limits cannot be known until “the GDPR matures via legal 
commentary, national implementation, and jurisprudence.”60 
Additional concerns revolve around Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR. 
Article 5 regarding transparency may present an issue to companies claiming 
the way their algorithms operate is a trade secret or that the exact purpose of 
the processing of data cannot be determined prior to running the machine 
learning program. Article 6 on privacy by design and privacy by default 
presents obstacles with big data as these concepts require that only data 
necessary for the purpose for which it is collected be obtained.61 It is 
 
 54 GDPR, supra note 36, art. 4(1); see also 95 Directive, supra note 53. 
 55 GDPR, supra note 36, art. 9(2)(a). 
 56 Model contract clauses and binding corporate resolutions can also be used. 
 57 Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Europe Is Still in the Lead when It Comes to Cracking 




 58 James Vincent, Google Hit with €1.5 Billion Antitrust Fine by EU, THE VERGE (Mar. 20, 2019, 
7:11 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/20/18270891/google-eu-antitrust-fine-adsense-advertising 
[https://perma.cc/3W6Q-DSGR]. 
 59 GDPR, supra note 36, art. 22. 
 60 Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data 
Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 494, 585 (2019). 
 61 See generally INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE LEARNING 
AND DATA PROTECTION (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-
data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW4F-J6KV]. 
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unknown if these provisions will be interpreted as preventing the use of data 
sets for training AI, but at the very least, they will impose a significant 
regulatory burden on companies choosing to use data sets.62 This difference 
between EU and U.S. data privacy protection has been described as follows: 
“in the United States, what the European Commission (the EU’s executive) 
refers to as the ‘collecting and processing of personal data’ is allowed unless 
it causes harm or is expressly limited by U.S. law.”63 In Europe, however, 
the “processing of personal data is prohibited unless there is an explicit legal 
basis that allows it.”64 As a result, companies in the EU have a very limited 
ability to use data needed for certain AI machine learning activities.65 China, 
on the other hand, has made use of the massive amounts of data collected in 
its country. 
c. China Data Protection Laws 
Contrary to popular belief, China actually has a rigorous set of privacy 
guidelines and regulations (unlike the U.S.),66 but they only apply to private 
industry.67 There are no limitations on the government’s ability to collect and 
process data or to request data collected by private industry.68 While the U.S. 
 
 62 Andrew Burt, How Will the GDPR Impact Machine Learning?, O’REILLY: RADAR (May 16, 
2018), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/how-will-the-gdpr-impact-machine-learning 
[https://perma.cc/FEU6-QEF4]. 
 63 MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU DATA PRIVACY: 
FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 2 & n.3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44257.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AX4L-WF86] (citing Eur. Comm’n, Collecting & Processing Personal Data: What Is 
Legal?, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/data-collection/legal/index_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4V6Z-V553]). 
 64 Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-EU in Data Privacy Protection, 36 UALR L. REV. 161, 164 
(2014); see also WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 63, at 2 & n.4 (citing Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and the European Union, 102 CALIF. L. 
REV. 877, 881 (2014)). 
 65 Burt, supra note 62. 
 66 See Samm Sacks, New China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching than GDPR, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-china-data-privacy-
standard-looks-more-far-reaching-gdpr [https://perma.cc/WBX6-QMRC]. 
 67 Some of the provisions are considered tougher than the GDPR. A recent proposed change would 
prevent data collection for the performance of a contract (even that is permitted under the GDPR). Ray 
Schultz, China Privacy Policy Tougher than GDPR, Attorney Writes, EMAIL MKTG. DAILY (July 15, 
2019), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/338173/ [https://perma.cc/AB35-P593]. 
 68 Two pieces of legislation are of particular concern to governments—the 2017 National 
Intelligence Law and the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law. Article 7 of the first law states that “any 
organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in 
accordance with the law,” adding that the state “protects” any individual and organization that 
aids it. 
 And it appears that organizations and individuals don’t have a choice when it comes to 
helping the government. The 2014 Counter-Espionage law says that “when the state security organ 
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and the EU publicly indicate an aversion to this type of surveillance, both 
blocks have monitored their own citizens’ behavior.69 In China, surveillance 
is expected. Due to different cultural norms, the Chinese have a lower 
expectation of privacy. The rights of the individual are subordinate to the 
rights of the family, community, and country.70 China is also known for its 
firewall. China has been able to protect private industry, such as social 
media, from U.S. intrusion by strictly limiting access to sites like Facebook 
and Google, which has helped its WeChat and Baidu sites prosper.71 The 
basis of China’s privacy and data security laws stems from a white paper 
published in 2010 that addressed Internet usage by citizens.72 In 2016, China 
passed its Cybersecurity Law, which went into effect in June 2017, is 
comprised of seventy-nine articles, and includes safeguards for national 
cyberspace sovereignty, protection of critical infrastructure, and data and 
privacy protections for individuals.73 Shortly after its enactment, China shut 
down 3,000 websites for their failure to comply with the new regulations.74 
 
investigates and understands the situation of espionage and collects relevant evidence, the relevant 
organizations and individuals shall provide it truthfully and may not refuse.” 
Arjun Kharpal, Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China’s Government. Experts Say It Wouldn’t 
Have a Choice, CNBC (Mar. 5, 2019, 12:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-
have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html [https://perma.cc/WG68-5RQ4]. 
 69 See Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Triples Collection of Data from U.S. Phone Companies, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-2017-annual-
report.html [https://perma.cc/VZE5-WCZV]; see also Asaf Lubin, A New Era of Mass Surveillance Is 
Emerging Across Europe, JUST SEC. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36098/era-mass-
surveillance-emerging-europe/ [https://perma.cc/X9X8-GHLN]. 
 70 Tiffany Li & Zhou Zhou, Chinese Privacy Law: A Practitioner’s Guide to Current Regulations, 
Future Trends, & Business Applications 7 (Jan. 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704131 [https://perma.cc/B2SH-38BJ]. 
 71 While strict censorship is nothing new in one-party China, under President Xi Jinping online 
restraints have grown tighter, particularly around the time of politically sensitive events like the 
death of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the Communist Party Congress in 2017. China 
began blocking Facebook’s WhatsApp messaging service ahead of the congress and extended a 
clampdown on virtual private networks, a commonly used method to circumvent the Great 
Firewall. Securing China’s “cyber sovereignty,” or protecting the country’s internet from undue 
foreign influence, is one of Xi’s avowed goals. 
The Great Firewall of China, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2018, 8:36 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china [https://perma.cc/FZ7K-AESV]. 
 72 The Internet in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (June 8, 2010, 1:05 PM), 
http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90785/7017177.html [https://perma.cc/VB7N-Q5V6]. 
 73 KPMG CHINA, OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW 3 (2017), 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/en/2017/02/overview-of-cybersecurity-law.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V59U-5FYF]. 
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There are some 240 national standards connected to cybersecurity (including 
the cloud and big data).75 It is generally understood that all companies (not 
just internet service providers and telecommunications companies) are 
subject to its provisions.76 The Chinese government itself also collects 
massive amounts of data on its citizens via facial recognition, license plate 
scanners, video surveillance, GPS tagging, and communications 
monitoring.77 
While the government has unrestricted access to personal data,78 private 
industry in China does not. China enacted a comprehensive privacy 
protection guideline that became effective May 1, 2018.79 Some consider it 
more onerous than the GDPR.80 One of the issues impacting the efficacy of 
Chinese privacy and data protection laws is the multitude of government 
players involved. Another issue is the law’s lack of specificity, preferring 
broad principles that help to accommodate the competing government 
agencies but create difficulty for private industry trying to stay in 
compliance.81 The agencies charged with enforcing these regulations include 
the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the National 
Information Security Standardization Technical Committee, as well as 
military and intelligence agencies that make decisions on what constitutes 
national security.82 In addition, there are several organizations that serve as 
intermediaries between private industry and the Chinese government, 
including the CyberSecurity Association of China, the China Artificial 
Intelligence Industry Development Alliance, and China’s most influential 
tech companies, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (together, BAT).83 
 
 75 Sacks, supra note 66. 
 76 PROTIVITI, supra note 74, at 2. 
 77 Zak Doffman, Why We Should Fear China’s Emerging High-Tech Surveillance State, FORBES 
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 78 Kharpal, supra note 68. 
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Phil Bradley-Schmieg, China Issues New Personal Information Protection Standard, COVINGTON: 
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 80 Sacks, supra note 66. 
 81 See Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber Security Law: The Impossibility Of 
Compliance?, FORBES (May 29, 2017, 3:29 AM), 
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 82 Paul Triolo et al., China’s Cybersecurity Law One Year On, NEW AM. (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/chinas-cybersecurity-law-one-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/F9ZT-G3MR]. 
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One overarching feature of Chinese data protection law is the focus on 
cybersecurity, which is lacking in both the U.S. and the EU. According to 
President Xi Jinping, “without cybersecurity there is no national security, 
and without informatization there is no modernization.”84 These security-
focused laws underlie the regulatory system. The Chinese government exerts 
a great deal of control over media and communication channels, both 
traditional and online.85 The new regulations permit the government to 
monitor all media and communication.86 While this is the antithesis of the 
concept of free speech under U.S. law, it should be noted that during many 
recent Congressional hearings, companies such as Facebook and Google 
were repeatedly asked why they do not block content.87 Additionally, the 
White House has floated a draft executive order that would give the Federal 
Communications Committee (FCC) and FTC the ability to monitor Internet 
content much like the Chinese currently do.88 
Additionally, regulations in China require the following: data on 
Chinese users must be stored in China (data localization requirement),89 a 
minimum level of security protections must be instituted to protect the data 
from a data breach, any transfer of data outside of China must meet strict 
requirements, and consent must be obtained prior to collecting information.90 
These requirements are placed on private tech companies. The government 
conducts inspections on these companies’ security protocols when the 
products and services are used in critical information infrastructures 
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 85 See SAMM SACKS & MANYI KATHY LI, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., HOW CHINESE 
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prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180802_Chinese_Cybersecurity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W4V4-QQK6]. These laws provide a secure environment within China but present 
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(utilities, media, etc.).91 Companies in both the U.S. and the EU regularly 
store data outside of their borders (except for Germany, which has a data 
localization law).92 The FTC does not audit companies for compliance, but 
instead investigates after a significant number of complaints. In the EU, due 
to the significant presence of data protection agencies, companies are 
scrutinized more closely than in the U.S.93 While some have criticized 
China’s data localization requirement as creating a “separate internet” from 
the rest of the world, it does have the effect of making Chinese data more 
secure vis-a-vis foreign bad actors.94 
One of the criticisms of Chinese regulations is that they seem to be more 
like principles than specific requirements. Their vagueness has caused issues 
for Chinese firms that have indicated that regulators can assess fines for 
failing to follow “recommended” standards.95 Another concern is the 
potential for competition between privately-owned and state-owned firms.96 
This may have the effect of hindering private development of both ancillary 
and AI technology.97 However, in 2018, President Xi named BAT, three of 
the top privately owned tech companies in China, as the country’s official 
“AI champions.”98 
Overall, China’s regulatory scheme, which promotes the use of data to 
advance AI, is working, as numerous advances, such as voice and facial 
recognition, are rolled out. While the U.S. lacks a cohesive policy around 
data collection and use, the EU has carefully developed its policy, but may 
overly restrict technological development. The ability to use data collected 
by companies in the EU for AI training sets is limited by the GDPR. 
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Although U.S. tech companies have taken advantage of the looser 
restrictions here, even they are now seeking the government’s help in 
creating a regulatory structure due to the inconsistent treatment by the U.S. 
government. Recent actions have been initiated against companies in the 
U.S. by the U.S. government despite the lack of federal laws specifically 
addressing the violations alleged regarding data breaches, antitrust issues, 
and privacy. China, on the other hand, has crafted a long-term strategic plan 
to become a technological powerhouse, developing technological products 
and services and moving away from its reliance on manufacturing. China’s 
laws support the development of AI in terms of data access and use. The 
difference in each region’s regulatory scheme stems from their vastly 
different policies regarding innovation in general. 
2. War Narratives and Competitive Ecosystems Are Unlikely to 
Result in Positive Community Outcomes 
In addition to the issues discussed above regarding data availability and 
data laws, differing governmental policies impact the education, hiring, and 
retention of talent, the different levels and sources of funding, and the 
complicated issue of component sourcing; there are a number of obstacles 
that will impact both the installation of the infrastructure needed for the 
practical application of AI as well as AI itself. Recent executive orders and 
regulations passed by the U.S. government have also negatively impacted 
the future of AI. Because of the speed at which the U.S. and China are 
seeking to roll out 5G and AI developments, there are a number of concerns 
that are being overlooked. First, significant health risks have been raised with 
respect to 5G installations. Second, the loss of privacy and the increased level 
of surveillance once sensors and small cells are placed everywhere have not 
been adequately addressed. Third, many have expressed unease at the 
potential impact on society due to a rushed, uncoordinated, and incautious 
implementation of AI by powers seeking to outdo one another. 
Perhaps due to the recent realization that the U.S. failed to carry out the 
strategic AI plan developed during the Obama administration, actions have 
now been taken to slow down China’s expansion both internally and world-
wide into 5G, the infrastructure for future developments in AI, and IoT.99 
China has made no secret of its desire to become a world economic power, 
seeking to move from a manufacturing base to an intellectual property and 
communication provider beyond its borders. In response, the U.S. has 
banned U.S. companies from doing business with Huawei, the largest 
supplier of 5G hardware, and is threatening its allies if they fail to do the 
 
 99 For a full discussion on the impact of the trade war on the future of artificial intelligence, see 
Houser, supra note 12. 
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same.100 The U.S. has also stopped the ready flow of U.S.-made chips into 
China.101 China has responded in kind with threats to severely restrict its 
exports to the U.S. of rare minerals needed for the computer chip industry.102 
Both have instituted tariffs on one another and created banned entity lists. 
Although many believe all of these acts are just bargaining chips that will be 
tossed aside if China and the U.S. can come to an agreement on tariffs, the 
damage may have already been done. Trade talks have stalled for a number 
of reasons, but one is the insistence by the U.S. that China halt its Made in 
China 2025 Plan.103 All of this has resulted in uncertainty in Europe over how 
to move forward with 5G without alienating either the U.S. or China. 
The EU has not acted to stop partnerships with China for the 
development of the infrastructure necessary to roll out 5G technology 
there.104 President Xi visited Italy and France in March 2019 as part of his 
Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI) tour.105 Because Huawei offers the lowest 
prices in 5G equipment, it is possible that these countries will choose the 
Chinese product over Eriksson and Nokia.106 In the EU, there is disagreement 
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over the risks of employing Chinese 5G cells throughout the member 
states.107 While Italy has signed on, other countries, in signing deals with 
China, have indicated that they will also work with China.108 Due to Italy’s 
economy, relying on China will help it advance technologically, but at the 
cost of $7.9 billion in debt (which includes energy, steel, and pipelines in 
addition to 5G).109 Poland, Greece, Portugal, and Hungary have also inked 
deals under the BRI, although none have entered into a final agreement with 
any Chinese companies for the installation of 5G yet.110 The countries that 
will be auctioning off 5G licenses in the EU this year are Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Lithuania, and Portugal.111 In fact, rather than take security 
claims by the U.S. seriously, some European nations have indicated that the 
Trump administration’s rhetoric was more likely due to the tech competition 
between the U.S. and China or the faltering trade negotiations.112 
3. The Absence of Coordination Is Incredibly Impactful 
While the narrative of an AI arms race may seem to spur on 
development and the best of competitive attitudes, in fact, a race is very 
troubling in this particular area. Remember, “[t]he last time a rival power 
tried to out-innovate the U.S. and marshaled a whole-of-government 
approach to doing it, the Soviet Union startled Americans by deploying the 
first man-made satellite into orbit.”113 
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Yet, this time is vastly different. First, an AI race lacks definition, a 
goal, or even an aspirational dream. Unlike placing an object in space, no 
one, not even those deep into the AI industry, could articulate a specific 
goal—nor could they tell you with any real certainty where the finish line 
is—as such, it is hard to imagine anyone ever truly winning this race. 
Moreover, even if we could define the “race” that we are desperately trying 
to win, there is a great deal of interest in the area now, and the reaction to 
some of the iterations of AI is pretty negative. So, if a term lacks definition, 
takes on a life of its own, and can be taken to mean everything from robots 
to predictions in policing, one wonders if all of it is tainted by the negative 
brush. How do you win a race when the citizens and policy makers begin to 
actively thwart your effort to win, even if we could define a finish line? 
There is a tension between advancement resulting in efficiencies and 
pulling back because of safety and discrimination concerns. If advancement 
succeeds without considering and addressing the potential harms, putting 
limits on the collection and use of data, and developing international 
standards, winning the race may lead us straight into a vast surveillance 
global society. There are numerous issues that must be worked out, and not 
in isolation. So, again, setting a short-term deployment without a long-term 
strategic plan might not be the best idea. Framing the development of AI as 
a race will result in losses for everyone. 
At the heart of this argument is the realization that we need to be careful 
to not think of this as a race—a race to spend money, deploy more, and do it 
faster—that the U.S. might just win. But at what cost to the bigger picture? 
This is not the same as putting an object in orbit or a man on the moon. This 
AI race has no end goal, no way to measure, and it seems there may be no 
way to think through where investment should be directed. And, unlike the 
object in space, the absence of a specific goal means we can continue to push 
an emotional narrative of winning, without ever being able to cross the finish 
line. 
We as a global community must reject this race narrative and seek to 
deploy technology, including AI, in ways that better mankind. Cooperation 
in these key identified areas will allows us to define a goal and to use data 
from the global community to have AI that is built upon diversity, fairness, 
ethics, and the pursuit of social good. Yet, the “win the race” narrative is 
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narratives of safety, security, and other usual arms race rhetoric.114 This must 
stop. Treating all of AI as being developed for the defense industry is a 
flawed approach, one that U.S. workers have pushed back against.115 The 
absence of coordination, regardless of whether it takes the form of regulation 
or international guidelines, has a drastic impact on the projects that are 
undertaken, the willingness to forgive bad AI, and the inability to evaluate 
the outcomes of the race. We must seek to coordinate toward a positive use 
and understanding of AI; without it, we will continue to be pushed by a 
narrative that shifts as the wind blows. 
B. Investment in Technology Ecosystem Is Essential 
While investment as an end goal is an incredibly poor choice, 
investment in the entire ecosystem, done in a planful, goal-oriented, societal 
way will result in positive steps in the further use of positively impactful AI. 
This Section examines concerns relating to the government policies that fail 
to focus on investment, the massive gaps in know-how and talent, the need 
to increase funding for development, demand for strategic planning for 
artificial intelligence, and the increasing evidence that demands we consider 
5G as essential infrastructure. 
1. Government Policy Fails to Focus on Investment 
Although the EU government has committed $24 billion (€20 billion) 
to the development of AI,116 the U.S. has relied on private funds to move this 
field forward.117 China’s government, on the other hand, is believed to have 
committed over $70 billion over the next several years to both public and 
privately owned entities.118 All three are struggling to find and hire qualified 
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data scientists and tech workers.119 Although the U.S. previously had the 
advantage of being able to attract workers from both China and the EU due 
to its high salaries, new governmental policy with respect to H-1B visas and 
the trade war have made the U.S. less attractive to foreign talent.120 The 
development of AI will depend not only on funding and available workers, 
but also on the ease and speed with which ancillary industries develop.121 
This presents one of the biggest obstacles. Although the installation of 5G 
telecommunication networks will exponentially increase the speed at which 
data can be processed well beyond 4G (LTE) and cloud computing, current 
political and technical issues are complicating the rollout. 
The trade war between the U.S. and China is impacting both countries’ 
ability to install 5G.122 Europe is stuck in the middle, with the U.S. 
threatening to withhold intelligence if Chinese equipment is installed there 
despite the fact that current telecommunications networks in the U.S. and EU 
already contain Chinese equipment.123 The interdependence of China and the 
U.S. on each other for 5G presents a serious problem. China produces most 
of the hardware currently available for these networks while the U.S. is the 
primary producer of the needed chips.124 The U.S. has virtually no 5G 
equipment capability and will need to rely on the EU and China for the 
hardware. Because each block now seeks to install 5G networks and develop 
AI independently of one another, this will slow down both the installation of 
5G worldwide as well as advances in AI.125 There are a number of other 
issues impacting the future of AI due to the differences between these 
regions. 
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2. Massive Gaps in Know-How and Talent 
In order to facilitate the growth of AI, you need both research talent and 
skilled workers to implement the infrastructure and AI. Not only does the 
U.S. churn out more data scientists than the rest of the world, it also hires 
them in greater numbers and pays them more.126 Those working for tech 
companies make an average of $120,000 a year and have a great deal of 
flexibility in what areas they want to pursue.127 The U.S. has more AI talent 
skilled in machine learning than both the EU and China.128 While the EU also 
has a demand for data scientists, it pays on average less than half of what 
employees can make in the U.S.129 The expected 2020 demand for data 
scientists in Europe is 346,000.130 China also has a shortage and pays less 
than the U.S.131 However, due to recently enacted H-1B restrictions in the 
U.S., more students are choosing to remain in China.132 In addition, H-4 visas 
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permitting spouses to work in the U.S. are also at risk.133 This governmental 
interference is causing the U.S. to lose its advantage in workers due to the 
uncertainty foreign workers have about their longevity in the U.S. and their 
new preference for other locations.134 
Depending on whether you use cited scholarly papers or patents as an 
indication of superior research, all three regions have made significant 
advances over the past decade and can argue superiority over the others.135 
Reviewing sheer numbers of papers on AI, Europe leads with 28%, China 
has 25%, and the U.S. has 17%.136 China leads with the most published 
papers specifically on deep learning.137 U.S. universities and tech companies 
hold the most patents on AI.138 A report put out by Stanford indicated that in 
the ten-year period examined from 2004 to 2014, 30% of all AI patents came 
out of the U.S.139 However, China argues that as of 2018, it actually has the 
greatest number of patents in AI.140 Because the U.S. makes some research 
open source, allowing advances to be made by other companies and 
universities, some argue that it removes this competitive advantage because 
China would also have access and be able to exploit research advances 
created in the U.S.141 With respect to 5G patents, China’s Huawei holds 
11,423, Sweden’s Ericsson 10,351, and Finland’s Nokia 6,878.142 
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There is a shortage of skilled workers who can install the infrastructure 
needed for future development in technology.143 China has the advantage of 
both a larger population than both the U.S. and EU combined and is working 
to solve the skill gap in its public school system, unlike the U.S.144 The EU’s 
Digital Single Market initiative also supports education for AI in schools, 
research centers, and joint business-education partnerships.145 There are 
expected to be two million jobs open by 2020 in the U.S., many of which 
will go unfilled146 The U.S. has not made education for the AI future a 
priority.147 While initially the U.S. had a major advantage in developing and 
retaining tech talent, recent actions by the recently-replaced U.S. Trump 
administration have made the U.S. much less attractive for foreign workers. 
The gap will likely increase there while decreasing in China and the EU, 
which have adopted policies promoting education in the area of AI designed 
to create a skilled workforce down the road. Additionally, tech centers will 
likely be moved out of the U.S. to areas that provide more favorable 
conditions, further depleting the U.S. tech force.148 
3. Increased Funding for Development 
In addition to workers, you also need money to develop AI. In just one 
company, Google, on just one project (self-driving cars), Google spent $1.1 
billion between 2009 and 2015 to create the needed AI technology.149 In 
China and the EU, funding for such projects has traditionally come from 
government-academic or government-industry partnerships; in the U.S. 
 
 143 In addition to tech workers to develop and advance 5G and AI technology, there is also a shortage 
for workers who can actually install 5G. For example, it is estimated that in the U.S. alone, 20,000 
additional tower climbers will be needed to build out 5G. Serious Workforce Shortage Has the Wireless 
Industry and FCC Pulling Together to Solve It, WIRELESSESTIMATOR.COM (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://wirelessestimator.com/articles/2019/serious-workforce-shortage-has-the-wireless-industry-and-
fcc-pulling-together-to-solve-it/ [https://perma.cc/96B6-J5LK]. 
 144 Zhang, supra note 126. 
 145 Eur. Comm’n, EU Member States Sign Up to Cooperate on Artificial Intelligence, EUROPA (Apr. 
10, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-member-states-sign-cooperate-
artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/2849-NHQQ]. 
 146 Zhang, supra note 126. 
 147 John R. Allen, Why We Need to Rethink Education in the Artificial Intelligence Age, BROOKINGS 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-we-need-to-rethink-education-in-the-artificial-
intelligence-age/ [https://perma.cc/2XHN-SGAU]. 
 148 Justin Shields, Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign Investment Regulation, National 
Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 51 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 
299–300 (2018). 
 149 Danielle Muoio, Google Spent at Least $1.1 Billion on Self-Driving Cars Before It Became 
Waymo, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 15, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-self-driving-
car-investment-exceeds-1-billion-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/XE6Y-JPU5]. 
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however, the bulk of funding has been left to private industry.150 It is reported 
that 80% of the top breakthroughs in AI in the U.S. over the past forty years 
came from private investment.151 
Overall government investment in AI by China exceeds that of other 
regions.152 China has allocated $30 billion to state-owned firms for the 
development of AI,153 with total government spending expected to reach $70 
billion.154 The U.S. government, on the other hand, has only allocated about 
$100 million per year over the past few years to AI research and development 
(R&D) projects.155 These projects fall under the purview of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), but funding for scientific research (outside the 
military) has actually been decreasing over the years since the 1960s.156 In 
fact, President Trump’s recent budget request would further cut funding to 
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the NSF by 13%.157 Even the 2019 American AI Initiative put out by the 
previous administration provides no new funding for AI research.158 
Despite the lack of attention to general AI funding by the U.S. federal 
government, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
has allocated funds to military AI R&D.159 In 2019, DARPA put out a request 
for proposals aimed at tech companies to assist with the development of 
technology needed for its AI Next campaign.160 One of the issues with 
requesting proposals for military uses of AI is the tech industry’s reluctance 
to become involved in that field. In June 2019, for example, Google decided 
not to renew its military contract with the Pentagon for Project Maven due 
to employee pushback.161 Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have also 
encountered similar objections to military projects.162 
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In terms of private funding, the U.S. is the leader in this regard but risks 
losing out to China due to consequences of the trade war. Although China 
initially focused its foreign direct investments in the U.S. tech industry, 
recent restrictions, discussed in Section III.A., have forced China to invest 
elsewhere forming new AI global partnerships around the world.163 AI start-
ups in Silicon Valley used to be the main recipient of AI venture capitalist 
funding, primarily from China.164 Silicon Valley, however, is now beginning 
to feel the pain from China’s withdrawal.165 A survey of 740 tech leaders 
indicated they expect Silicon Valley to be replaced by new tech hubs due to 
increased investments outside of Silicon Valley.166 In fact, in 2018, almost 
half of all venture capital in AI went to firms in China.167 Chinese start-ups 
raised $4.9 billion, compared to the U.S.’s $4.4 billion.168 
The EU government (along with member states and private industry) 
has pledged €20 billion over the next two years for AI R&D.169 An additional 
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first in financing for AI ventures with 577 out of 745 entities raising over $55.4 billion according to a 
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€27 billion has been earmarked for skills development for AI.170 France and 
the UK in particular have initiated plans that rely on education and 
innovation, with both pledging €1.4–1.5 billion.171 The EU also has the 
benefit of twenty-eight member states that can pool their resources.172 
However, each state has differing plans for AI, which may be at odds with 
the vison of the EU as the leader in human-centric AI.173 The EU, realizing 
the need to ramp up its basic research in AI, has allocated €50 million to such 
projects.174 Similar to China, the EU is looking to create AI research centers 
throughout its member states.175 The U.S. government has no comparable 
plan for the creation of research centers. 
In sum, China has made a massive investment in AI technology, which 
shows no signs of slowing. It has reduced its investment in the U.S., which 
will negatively impact private AI start-ups there. The U.S. government still 
has not come up with a plan to either guide or fund AI research (outside of 
military uses) and is relying on private industry to move the field forward. 
The EU is taking a cautious approach to developing AI through education, 
research centers, and guidelines for the ethical development of AI. 
4. Strategic Planning for Artificial Intelligence 
As indicated earlier, AI is not an isolated technology, but rather a field 
of science that consists of many different technologies with many different 
applications.176 AI can be used to make processes more efficient, pathology 
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detection more accurate, and travel by cars safer.177 AI can also be used to 
hack into the electrical grid, manipulate voters, and create autonomous 
weapons.178 Due to the incredible transformative power of AI for both good 
and bad, it is imperative that countries create a national strategy around its 
development.179 AI will impact each country’s population base, industries, 
and economy. AI must be developed in a way that maximizes its benefits and 
minimizes its risks.180 
Both China and the EU have developed detailed strategic plans for the 
use and development of AI.181 These include various initiatives for funding, 
education, scientific research, ethics, infrastructure, and standards.182 
Although a national AI plan was prepared during the Obama 
administration,183 it has not been followed through.184 According to Chris 
Demchak of the Cyber Innovation Policy Institute, “[i]n the pursuit of AI 
dominance, a strategically coherent nation is more likely to announce 
strategic goals in investments, R&D, and education, and streamline actions 
to achieve those advances across sectors.”185 There is no doubt that China has 
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obtained strategic coherence when it comes to AI.186 The 2019 American AI 
Initiative hastily put out by the previous U.S. administration is not really a 
strategic plan, but rather a brief statement of what the government would like 
to do; it mostly appears to be a reaction to China’s progress.187 One of the 
risks from the U.S. government’s lack of direction and support is that most 
development will continue to be in the commercial area supported by private 
funding,188 not AI for public good.189 In addition, the U.S. government still 
has no coordinated plan for the rollout of 5G.190 This is especially concerning 
as the FCC has made the least workable bandwidths available for 5G to 
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standards for 5G equipment are uncertain at this point.192 In discussing the 
U.S. position on 5G, Nigel Inkster, a former British intelligence official and 
senior advisor at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, stated, 
I think they’ve been rather leaden-footed in the way they’ve responded. 
Firstly[,] by lacking an explicit, government-articulated strategy in relation to 
5G which is only now starting to emerge, but also in arguing or shaping the 
challenge from China and from Huawei solely as an espionage issue.193 
China, on the other hand, began to prepare for the rollout of 5G in 2013 
when it created a regulatory board fitted with members from the academic 
and industrial community to oversee the process.194 
The government and private industry in the U.S. have an uneasy 
relationship, resulting from the government’s desire to both limit what 
private industry can do with data (due to the attention given to the Cambridge 
Analytica debacle),195 while at the same time encouraging private industry to 
help with the weaponization of AI for the military.196 The U.S. federal 
government’s lack of understanding of technology has resulted in disjointed 
policy and a lack of updated laws.197 The U.S. government has also 
encountered problems in meeting its military needs due to U.S. tech 
companies pledging not to help the U.S. military in this regard.198 
China, on the other hand, has a robust strategy aimed at all areas of AI, 
which includes the needed 5G infrastructure.199 In 2017, China released its 
 
 192 This presents problems with the potential for U.S. companies to expand into foreign markets. 
Because China, the EU, and the U.S. all developed their own cell phone standards without cooperation, 
telecom companies are limited to their own areas. For example, while the EU chose GSM (Global System 
for Satellite Communication), the U.S. bet on CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access). Although 4G 
runs on LTE, phone service is not interchangeable (thus the need to either use roaming or switch out SIM 
cards when traveling to foreign countries). Houser, supra note 12, at 601–05. 
 193 Elizabeth Schulze, The US Is Attacking Huawei and China — Without Its Own 5G Strategy, 
CNBC (Apr. 21, 2019, 10:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/22/us-attacks-huawei-and-china-
without-a-5g-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/WHK5-7VYZ]. 
 194 Josh Chin, The Internet, Divided Between the U.S. and China, Has Become a Battleground, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-internet-divided-between-the-u-s-and-
china-has-become-a-battleground-11549688420 [https://perma.cc/ZQ4H-7XWT]. 
 195 Congress Is Trying to Create a Federal Privacy Law, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/02/28/congress-is-trying-to-create-a-federal-privacy-
law [https://perma.cc/3HXE-4V56]. 
 196 Tom Simonite, The Pentagon Doubles Down on AI–and Wants Help from Big Tech, WIRED (Feb. 
12, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/pentagon-doubles-down-ai-wants-help-big-tech/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UE9-EZ25]. 
 197 Devin Coldewey, Congress Flaunts Its Ignorance in House Hearing on Net Neutrality, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/07/congress-flaunts-its-
ignorance-in-house-hearing-on-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/E4TL-MG75]. 
 198 Horgan, supra note 162. 
 199 As part of China’s Belts and Road initiative, it is seeking to install its 5G equipment in Asia and 
Europe allowing them to “maximize the opportunities they have for extending their influence in the world 
18:129 (2021) Abandoning the AI ‘Race’ 
161 
Next-Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (the “China AI 
Plan”), seeking to be the world’s leader in AI by 2030.200 The plan builds off 
of the Made in China 2025 Plan201 and contains three major benchmarks: 
boost innovation and advanced technology integration by 2025, “reach parity 
with global industry at intermediate levels” by 2035, and “lead global 
manufacturing and innovation with a competitive position in advanced 
technology and industrial systems by 2049.”202 The China AI Plan addresses 
research, infrastructure, educating future workers, business, and academia.203 
It demonstrates an understanding of how AI can improve all industries, 
including manufacturing, healthcare, agriculture, and national defense.204 It 
recognizes the importance of government-industry partnerships.205 While this 
creates financial advantages for business, it also allows the government to 
play an enormous role in guiding the development of AI.206 The goal of the 
China AI Plan is to become a world leader in AI by 2025 and the “primary” 
center for AI innovation by 2030.207 
The governmental strategy in the EU reflects a desire to balance 
government, private industry, and academic development of AI with 
protections for its citizenry.208 The EU is focused on increasing investment 
 
and underpinning their global position and power,” according to Anthony Glees, director of the Centre 
for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham. Schulze, supra note 193. 
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in AI, preparing for socio-economic changes, and devising an ethical and 
legal framework for the development of AI.209 In 2017, AI4People was the 
first global forum in Europe to address the social impact of AI.210 It included 
European delegates from industry, academia, and government.211 In 2018, the 
EU issued the EU Declaration on Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence to 
obtain buy-in from member states to address the social, economic, ethical, 
and legal questions resulting from the development of AI.212 The motto of 
the Commission is “AI for good and for all.”213 This type of consideration 
appears secondary in both China and the U.S.214 
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In 2018, the EU adopted the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence 
(the “EU Plan”).215 The earlier European Strategy on AI focused on 
encouraging human-centric AI.216 The more recent EU Plan provides 
financial investment commitments to private industry, coordination between 
academia and private industry, education and retention of qualified talent, 
and the development of ethical and security guidelines. Recently, a draft 
document of a “European Future Fund” indicated a desire to invest €100 
billion in European tech companies to compete with those in China and the 
U.S.217 The EU is also at the forefront of investigating the health concerns 
surrounding the installation of 5G small cells on light poles and buildings.218 
Although the EU does not want to see a fragmented AI policy, that 
looks to be the future in the EU. The great disadvantage that the EU has is 
its incredible amount of bureaucracy.219 It will take years for it to approve a 
regulatory scheme.220 What can be viewed as either a positive or negative, 
the member states of the EU have individually set their course of AI 
development and are moving ahead.221 What is clear is that each of these 
blocks—China, the U.S., and the EU—is proceeding individually and 
without coordination. Although the EU does not consider itself to be in a 
race with the U.S. and China for all things AI, it has announced its goal of 
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becoming the leader in ethical AI.222 The EU Commission has acknowledged, 
“[f]or the EU, it is not so much a question of winning or losing a race but of 
finding the way of embracing the opportunities offered by AI in a way that 
is human-centered, ethical, secure, and true to our core values.”223 
It should be noted that although China appears to have a robust strategic 
plan for the economic development of AI and the EU for the ethical 
development of AI, the U.S. is in the very early stages of AI development 
and has years to go before AI applications (such as autonomous vehicles) are 
commonplace. The main thrust of the AI future depends on the actual 
installation of the infrastructure. It is this area where the world has hit a major 
roadblock. 
5. Considering 5G as Essential Infrastructure 
Our future is going to be “data-centric” . . . [a]nd 5G will form our infrastructure 
in the same way that roads and power grids formed our industrial 
infrastructure.224 
The availability of and legal ability to use data to train machines are 
critical to advances in AI.225 Additionally, AI development and 
implementation will be affected by the availability of research talent and 
skilled workers, the accessibility of funding, and by the presence of or lack 
of a governmental strategic plan.226 While most people think about improving 
download speeds on their cell phones as the reason for the move to 5G, it is 
actually the foundation of the future globally connected digital society on 
which AI will run.227 AI is currently being used to automate processes, 
evaluate and produce decisions, and make predictions. As discussed in Part 
I, AI of the future will involve the widespread implementation of the Internet 
of Things (IoT), including autonomous vehicles, connected medical devices, 
 
 222 LEVERHULME CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF INTEL., A SURVEY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ECOSYSTEM 10 (2019), 
http://lcfi.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Stix_Europe_AI_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V2A-476R]. 
 223 Reynolds, supra note 175. 
 224 Vox Creative, 5G Is Close to Becoming the New Normal — and It’ll Change Everything, RECODE 
(Oct. 18, 2018, 4:11 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sandra Rivera, senior vice president 
and general manager of the Network Platforms Group at Intel), https://www.recode.net/ad/17994626/5g-
industry-communications [https://perma.cc/Y6GL-TMPL]. 
 225 See supra Section II.A. 
 226 See supra Section II.B. 
 227 There are any number of technologies that can facilitate AI and IoT including the potential of 
WiFi6. While 5G will be installed outdoors, WiFi6 will be used primarily for indoor wireless 
connectivity. This paper focuses on 5G because it is the most likely immediate source for the 
infrastructure needed for widespread AI and IoT applications. For an explanation of the differences 
between 5G and WiFi6 and their potential for integration, see Brandon Vigliarolo, Wi-Fi 6 (802.11ax): A 
Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/wi-fi-6-
802-11ax-a-cheat-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/7J94-BKH5]. 
18:129 (2021) Abandoning the AI ‘Race’ 
165 
and smart factories and cities.228 Thus, the practical application of advances 
in AI require that the infrastructure be in place in sufficiently broad physical 
areas so that data can be transmitted and processed at high speeds with low 
latency.229 
5G is the fifth generation of wireless communications. A cell phone is 
a radio-powered mobile device. The device has an internal modem and 
antenna. Wireless technology sends data from the mobile device to a base 
station (cell tower) containing an antenna and telecommunication equipment 
to receive and transmit data. Wires then carry the data to the carrier’s servers. 
These radio waves travel in designated spectrum bands. Just like you have 
to tune a radio station to a specific channel, wireless devices operate on set 
spectrum bands. 4G (LTE), for the most part in the U.S., operates on low-
range bands that can travel long distances, permitting cell towers to be placed 
as far as one to two miles apart in suburban areas, up to twenty-two miles 
apart for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and forty-five 
miles apart for Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and Integrated 
Digital Enhanced Network (IDEN) transmissions.230 With 5G, the distance 
between base stations is dependent upon the spectrum band assigned to the 
carrier. Radio waves, in which 5G will operate, fall between three kilohertz 
(kHz) and 300 giga hertz (GHz).231 Low range bands generally operate 
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between 300 megahertz (MHz) and three GHz. These frequencies are also 
used for TV, GPS, Wi-Fi, cordless phones, and Bluetooth. Lower 
frequencies mean lower speeds but longer distances.232 Mid-range 
frequencies are considered the “sweet spot” for radio transmissions and 
occur between three GHz and six GHz.233 High range bands are over six GHz, 
with millimeter bands (mmWave) occurring above thirty GHz.234 
In most of the world, including Europe and China, mid-range bands 
have been opened up (or reassigned from 4G), which can allow the 
installation of 5G equipment on current 4G towers in these sweet spot 
ranges.235 In the U.S., the recently-replaced Trump administration has only 
made mmWave ranges available for 5G auction.236 The U.S.’s lack of a 
strategic 5G rollout plan will greatly increase the cost of creating this 
infrastructure upon which AI will build, because the 5G cells cannot be 
placed on current cell towers and new, closely set base stations will need to 
be created as mmWaves have a short range and are impacted by solid objects 
and weather.237 By designating different spectrum bands for 5G than the rest 
of the world, the U.S. will eliminate itself from the global 5G market and 
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“will also be faced with mmWave device interoperability challenges and 
sub-6 infrastructure security concerns.”238 
In addition to allocating the least desirable bandwidths to 5G and failing 
to fund the massive cost of this new infrastructure, the U.S. also has the 
problem of potential 5G equipment shortages.239 In 2018, China supplied 
60% of total information, communications, and telecommunications 
equipment imports to the U.S.240 The main supplier of 5G network equipment 
is China-based Huawei.241 The four companies that account for over two-
thirds of the market are Sweden’s Ericsson, Finland’s Nokia, and China’s 
Huawei and ZTE.242 With respect to telecom hardware, no U.S. company 
comes even close to the top four telecom equipment suppliers in the world.243 
Because the U.S. government has effectively banned the use of Chinese-
originated equipment, this presents significant issues for the rollout of 5G 
here.244 European carriers that have used Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson 5G 
equipment have indicated that the European companies’ offerings are 
inferior to those of Huawei.245 The U.S. government policy around 5G seems 
to be one of reaction, rather than a planned, coordinated rollout. 
While the U.S. has threatened to withhold intelligence from countries 
that do not ban Chinese components from the buildout of their 5G 
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infrastructure,246 Europe is in a tough spot, as much of the current 
infrastructure was built using components from Huawei and ZTE, both 
Chinese companies.247 Huawei alone provides telecommunications products 
in 170 countries.248 It already provides much of the network infrastructure in 
Europe with Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, and BT Group.249 Additionally, 
Huawei’s prices are about 30% lower than Eriksson and Nokia, which is very 
attractive to the EU.250 
With respect to the U.S.’s warning about the risks to the EU by utilizing 
Chinese-originated equipment, Andrus Ansip, the European Commissioner 
for the Single Digital Market, has not recommended a ban on Huawei 
products and has pointed out that the Network and Information Systems 
Directive and Cybersecurity Act are designed to protect systems from the 
types of issues the U.S. has warned about.251 The U.S. does not have a 
national cybersecurity law, and the few data protection laws it does have 
indicate that firms must utilize “reasonable measures” to keep data secure.252 
The EU will leave the decision on whose equipment to adopt to each 
individual country based on their own national security concerns.253 Arguing 
that Chinese equipment presents a security risk ignores that it may already 
be embedded in the supply chain.254 A 2017 U.S. Department of Defense 
Report noted that vulnerabilities in weapon systems exist currently because 
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“almost all were developed, acquired, and fielded without formal protection 
plans.”255 In other words, due to multiple sources of components, software 
upgrades, electronic communications, and all of the differing entry points for 
malicious intervention, any risk already exists. 
Although the EU is taking a cautious approach due to the U.S.’s call for 
it to exclude Chinese-made equipment in its 5G infrastructure, the EU is 
actually in a better position than the U.S. with respect to the rollout. Unlike 
the U.S., the EU has created a multi-stage 5G deployment strategic plan, 
which includes pilots in cities across the EU.256 Also, unlike the U.S., the EU 
has created standards for 5G spectrums as well as for equipment, allowing 
for interchangeability of components.257 Additionally, it has the advantage of 
two of the top four telecommunication equipment suppliers in the EU (Nokia 
and Ericsson). The 5G industry is further helped by the availability of local 
chipmakers, such as UK-based ARM, Germany-based Infineon 
Technologies AG, and Austria-based AMS AG.258 
Both the U.S. and the EU will have an issue trying to build off of an 
infrastructure composed of 4G equipment made by Huawei with non-
Huawei 5G equipment.259 Huawei equipment is not interoperable, meaning 
Eriksson 5G equipment cannot be added to existing Huawei 4G 
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 259 Huawei’s executive director, Ryan Ding, speaking at the Global Mobile Broadband Forum in 
London last October explained the ability of linking 4G and 5G equipment with Huawei’s 4G/5G kit, 
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equipment.260 This gives China an enormous advantage as Huawei’s 
telecommunications equipment can be found in 29% of the world’s 
telecommunications infrastructures.261 Deutsche Telekom out of Germany 
has indicated that if Huawei is banned in Europe, it could delay the 
deployment of 5G by up to two years.262 As of the June 2019, Huawei had 
entered into fifty commercial contracts for the installation of 5G equipment 
outside of China.263 
Conversely, the Chinese reliance on American-made chips will impact 
the rollout of 5G there. The three companies working on advanced 5G chips 
are Anokiwave, Edgewater Wireless, and Barefoot Networks out of the U.S. 
and Canada.264 Sixteen percent of Huawei’s spending on components went 
to the U.S. in 2018.265 Analyst Charlie Dai indicated that even though Huawei 
has been stockpiling inventory, it will be difficult to roll out 5G globally if 
Huawei is cut off from U.S. parts due to the current ban.266 Former President 
Trump issued an executive order on May 16, 2019, which added Huawei to 
a trade blacklist; consequently, U.S. companies will be unable to transfer 
hardware, software, and technical services to Huawei.267 The Commerce 
Department, however, has delayed enforcement of the ban through August 
19, 2019, to prevent telecom blackouts.268 The trade ban does not just hurt 
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China; “U.S. firms could lose up to $56.3 billion in export sales over five 
years from stringent export controls on technologies involving Huawei or 
otherwise, the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation said in a 
report. Missed opportunities threatened as many as 74,000 jobs, the 
foundation said.”269 
In addition to a shortage of chips needed for its 5G installations due to 
the ban by the U.S., China also faces an issue with high-end electronic 
processors (AI chips).270 China is very reliant on foreign-made chips.271 The 
main suppliers of chips to companies in China are U.S.-based Intel and 
AMC.272 Intel has recently developed a chip that can process data 1,000 times 
faster than typical Central Processing Units (CPUs).273 In 2017, China 
controlled less than 1% of the global chip market.274 However, as part of its 
Made in China 2025 Plan, but mostly out of necessity due to the U.S. trade 
ban, it is aggressively seeking to become proficient in developing chips, and 
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to reduce its reliance on the U.S.275 Companies such as Taiwan-based 
chipmakers MediaTek and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Company, Korea-based Samsung and SK Hynix, and Japan-based Tokyo 
Electron, will initially be the likely alternatives.276Although China began 
investing in this industry in 2014, it is still about ten years behind the U.S.277 
This presents the greatest obstacle to 5G technology rollout in China.278 
Although neither China nor the U.S. will admit this, neither can afford to 
lose the other without delaying 5G installation. 
III. WITH INDUSTRY IN CHARGE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE BEING 
FORGOTTEN 
All three blocks have differing concerns around AI. While the U.S. 
fears losing its position as a tech leader and is attempting to roll out 5G as 
quickly as possible, less attention is being paid to the risks of loss of privacy, 
automated decision-making, surveillance, and health concerns. In the EU, a 
cautious approach is being taken to the development of AI, with the creation 
of regulations and standards for such technologies with an intentionally 
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slower timeline for 5G installation. While the EU has acknowledged that AI 
can bring enormous benefits, the concerns are that in sensitive areas, such as 
political campaigns, human resource management, and the criminal justice 
system, AI presents a real problem due to the “black box” issue.279 China’s 
society is the most likely to quickly embrace developments in AI and is 
moving in concert with its strategic plans.280 However, competing to win may 
prevent necessary safeguards from being implemented. The EU report on AI 
sums it up as: the U.S. sees AI for profit, China sees it for control, and the 
EU sees it for society.281 
A. 5G Safety 
A major obstacle to the rollout of 5G is the public’s concern over safety 
of the small cells that will need to be installed much closer together than cell 
towers for 3G and 4G are currently placed.282 5G transmissions on higher 
broadbands have a limited range and cannot pass through solid objects.283 
This could require small cells in urban areas to be placed 500 feet or less 
apart, most likely on telephone poles or lampposts. Current cell towers can 
be located up to forty-five miles apart.284 The Environmental Health Trust 
has recommended a moratorium on 5G installations until such devices have 
been proven safe to humans and the environment.285 The concern is that the 
density of placements and the proximity to homes present dangers due to the 
increased radiation from the “small cells, distributed antennae system, and 
microcells.”286 Belgium has delayed signing on Brussels as a test city for 5G 
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installation because of the difficulty in testing the amount of radiation the 
small cells will emit. Switzerland is working on a radiation monitoring 
system, which will also delay the rollout.287 A number of cities in California 
have also stopped the installation of the small cells.288 The 2018 European 
Commission on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks lists 5G 
technologies as a risk to public health and the environment.289 In the UK, 
disputes between local governments and telecoms have slowed installation 
because of the fees the governments wish to charge the telecoms for access 
to lampposts.290 In the U.S., both the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Federal Communications Commission have indicated that adverse health 
outcomes are not likely.291 This conclusion conflicts with the two recent 
studies demonstrating that “non-ionizing radiation emitted by cell phone 
networks” does increase the risk of cancer in animals.292 Although China has 
not indicated that 5G does or does not propose a health threat, it is of note 
that most of the reports are concerned with the risks from mmWaves, which 
 
 287 Aaron Pressman, Health Concerns May Slow Rollout of Super-Fast 5G Mobile Networks, Analyst 
Warns, FORTUNE (May 22, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2019/05/22/health-concerns-5g-
cellphones-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/7XCY-3AQL]. 
 288 How to Oppose 5G “Small Cell” Towers, EMF SAFETY NETWORK, 
http://emfsafetynetwork.org/how-to-oppose-small-cell-5g-towers/ [https://perma.cc/AY6W-MQ4G]; see 
also Danny Crichton, Bay Area City Blocks 5G Deployments over Cancer Concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 
10, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/10/bay-area-city-blocks-5g-deployments-over-
cancer-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/2XWJ-8Y64]. 
 289 Sci. Comm. on Health, Env’t and Emerging Risks, Eur. Comm’n, Statement on Emerging Health 
and Environmental Issues, at 14 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://mdsafetech.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/scheer-
report-emerging-concerns-2018-russell-mentioned.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUE7-KE7C]. 
 290 Matthew Weaver, Revealed: 5G Rollout Is Being Stalled by Rows over Lampposts, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 19, 2019, 11:37 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/may/19/revealed-5g-rollout-is-being-stalled-by-rows-
over-lampposts [https://perma.cc/6A5E-DBJ9]. 
 291 Scientific Evidence for Cell Phone Safety, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/radiation-emitting-products/cell-phones/current-research-results 
[https://perma.cc/PX5N-3R7M]. The FCC ruled 5G technology to be safe on August 7, 2019. Marguerite 
Reardon, FCC Deems Cellphones with 5G Tech Safe, CNET (Aug. 8, 2019, 2:23 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/fcc-deems-5g-safe/ [https://perma.cc/KNG5-KTSK]. The FCC has not 
updated its cell phone standards since 1996, which may explain why its current safety standards do not 
reflect any risks. Marguerite Reardon, Is 5G Making You Sick? Probably Not, CNET (July 30, 2020, 5:00 
AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/5g-phones-and-your-health-what-you-need-to-know/ 
[https://perma.cc/L7XH-A8ZB] [hereinafter Reardon, Is 5G Making You Sick]. 
 292 Charles Schmidt, New Studies Link Cell Phone Radiation with Cancer, SCI. AM. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-studies-link-cell-phone-radiation-with-cancer/ 
[https://perma.cc/LBQ8-U3YN]. Any release of energy from any source is considered radiation. The 
higher the frequency, the greater potential for harm. Ionizing rays, such as x-rays, are very harmful and 
can cause cancer with too much exposure. 5G waves are considered non-ionizing, but many cell phone 
carriers will be installing small cell, which operate at higher levels (known as mmWaves) than 3G and 
4G. This means that the risk of harm is increased by using these higher frequencies, but because testing 
has not yet been done on 5G transmissions, studies do not confirm this at this time. Reardon, Is 5G Making 
You Sick, supra note 291. 
18:129 (2021) Abandoning the AI ‘Race’ 
175 
will be the foundation of the 5G infrastructure in the U.S. but not in the EU 
or China. 
B. Surveillance 
Although a detailed discussion of all of the opportunities for 5G and AI 
surveillance are beyond the scope of this paper, a few items of note are 
explained here. First, there is concern that Huawei will allow the Chinese 
government to spy on any communications sent through Huawei’s 
equipment.293 This is the reason given for the U.S. ban of the use of 5G 
equipment made by Huawei.294 Although the U.S. has discouraged the EU 
from adopting Huawei equipment for its 5G installation, as discussed above, 
several countries, including Portugal, Italy, and Germany, have indicated a 
willingness to upgrade their Huawei 4G systems to 5G, suggesting that there 
is no direct evidence of spying by Huawei and that security measures in place 
are an effective deterrent.295 Many note that it is possible that the U.S.’s 
position has less to do with security concerns and more to do with economic 
ones.296 Regardless of what company from what country provides the 
equipment for 5G, any online network is subject to hacking and secret 
surveillance.297 Due to the Snowden disclosures, the world is already familiar 
with the U.S.’s National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance of mass 
communications.298 It has also been reported that telecommunications 
companies in the U.S. are freely providing metadata to the U.S. government 
without a warrant.299 
There is also concern about the potential for surveillance as AI sensors 
become widespread.300 Numerous scholars have explained how “smart 
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cities” will have the potential to further erode privacy protections due to the 
increase in government surveillance activities that ubiquitous sensors 
represent.301 This concern is more prevalent in the EU and the U.S. As 
mentioned above, residents in China have a lower expectation of privacy due 
to their culture. While residents of the U.S. indicate a desire for privacy 
protections, their actions demonstrate a willingness to share their personal 
data without much regard to how it is used or where it is shared.302 The EU 
is especially concerned about increased surveillance.303 Scholars have also 
brought attention to the possibility that authoritarianism will be advanced 
through AI by the use of “surveillance, censorship, disinformation, and 
cyberattacks.”304 
Artificial intelligence is already being used in China for surveillance 
and censorship by its government.305 Although Chinese culture generally 
accepts the tradeoff of privacy for security and access to a greater extent than 
the U.S. and certainly more than the EU, the extent to which government is 
guiding behavior is of concern. The risk this technological capability 
presents is its export to authoritarian regimes or its unregulated use to 
manipulate elections, as the Russian government has been accused of, or 
engage in cyber-attacks, such as the WannaCry ransomware attack which 
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was facilitated by code developed by the U.S. NSA.306 It is unlikely that any 
set of standards regarding government surveillance will emerge, given the 
current political environment. 
C. AI Risks 
Because China and the U.S. are viewing AI as a race, they are 
negligently moving forward without acknowledging or addressing the risks. 
Little effort has gone into the creation of ethical standards and international 
agreements on use by either. Europe, on the other hand, is spending most of 
its ramp-up time in this regard but only recently determined that its industry 
is falling behind in actual development.307 Studies disagree on whether AI 
will eliminate or create jobs,308 but there is a need to understand, at the very 
least, what skills should be taught in the school system to meet the eventual 
AI revolution.309 One of the greatest concerns associated with the fourth 
industrial revolution is inequality.310 Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss how these risks will manifest, these issues should be 
addressed prior to forging ahead with AI development in order to win a 
“race.” These include risks with automated decisions,311 human rights,312 
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programming ethics into autonomous vehicles,313 autonomous weapons,314 
social and political manipulation,315 invasion of privacy,316 destabilization of 
the financial system,317 product safety, liability and consumer protection,318 
proxy discrimination,319 and cybercrime and cyberwarfare.320 
One particular risk is that AI systems are especially valuable in assisting 
authoritarian regimes. A failure to seek agreement now on international 
standards and limitations for the use of AI could lead developments down a 
path that could endanger global safety.321 Although some point to China’s 
social credit score as an example of a repressive regime, others see it as 
filling a void in Chinese society in alignment with Chinese culture.322 A 
positive step with respect to at least a local level of acknowledgement was 
taken in May 2019, when the Beijing AI Principles were released, which 
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include a call for “the construction of a human community with a shared 
future, and the realization of beneficial AI for humankind and nature.”323 
These principals were created by a coalition of stakeholders from 
government, industry, and academia in China and “focus on benefitting all 
of humanity and the environment; serving human values such as privacy, 
dignity, freedom, autonomy, and rights; continuous focus on AI safety and 
security; inclusivity; openness; supporting international cooperation and 
avoiding a ‘malicious AI race’; and long-term planning for more advanced 
AI systems, among others.”324 While the AI Initiative indicates that “[t]he 
United States must foster public trust and confidence in AI technologies and 
protect civil liberties, privacy, and American values in their application in 
order to fully realize the potential of AI technologies for the American 
people,” it does not provide any explanation on how this would be 
accomplished.325 
The final risk that needs to be addressed is that of cyber warfare. The 
main government sponsored initiative for AI in the U.S. is for the military. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has pledged $2 
billion for its “AI Next” campaign.326 When people think of AI uses by the 
military, they automatically jump to killer-robots. It is important to 
remember that technology can be used for good, bad, or neutral (efficiency) 
purposes. AI can be used to assist with training systems, surveillance 
analytics, logistical support, the use of unmanned vehicles, and aircrafts to 
carry supplies, all of which can all be used without threatening lives.327 AI 
can also be employed to decrypt military communications and to hack into 
weapon systems, distributed denial of services, and cyber-attack utilities and 
other infrastructures. The real concern is not that other countries may be 
working on these types of technologies, because most assuredly they are; 
rather, the concern is that there is no understanding of what the future of war 
will look like or how to respond in kind when it is not just state actors 
engaging in cyberwarfare but also individuals and groups hostile to an 
administration.328 This is an area in which international institutions and 
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agreements would be of enormous benefit.329 Much like the 1968 Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) with 191 signatories,330 countries could 
agree that the risks are not worth the potential harms of weaponizing AI for 
assured mutual destruction. Some argue that even if countries agree to stop 
developing autonomous weapons, countries could still secretly violate such 
agreements. However, bringing this issue out in the open and agreeing to a 
set of principles, at the very least provides a system of checks and balances 
to monitor the development of such technologies. As the NPT was set to be 
reexamined in 2020, but it is still important to get around a table to promote 
cooperation and peaceful uses of AI. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although each region’s strengths and weaknesses have been touched 
on, the current situation is highly complicated. The interdependence of these 
regions remains unacknowledged and the U.S. and China are moving at full 
tilt without regard to how their trajectory will impact the world.331 Given the 
impact that AI will have in areas beyond where the technology is created, 
attention to the sweeping societal and economic effects must be addressed. 
While arguments can be made to name China or the U.S. the winner, each 
will have difficulty advancing by shutting out the other. However, it is the 
U.S. that risks losing its position due to its failure in policy with respect to 
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5G. Regardless, it is imperative that all countries come to an agreement on 
how to proceed responsibly.332 
First, the AI race narrative must be discarded. With the U.S. seeking to 
shut out the spread of Chinese technology, not only is industry in these two 
regions impacted, but the EU is also caught in the middle. The U.S. and 
China must acknowledge their interdependence and work to responsibly 
advance AI, addressing health, safety, and fairness issues. Rather than 
isolating researchers from one another, funding must be dedicated to the 
responsible development of AI. While the EU is well on its way to meeting 
this goal, global agreement must be obtained on its trajectory and standards. 
Second, the education of future workers on technology and AI must be 
made a priority. Those with the technical expertise to develop, install, and 
program AI and infrastructure are in short supply.333 While China334 has taken 
the initiative in training along with the EU,335 the U.S. has no educational 
policy and certainly has dedicated no governmental money to developing 
this needed workforce. Because many types of AI can be developed from 
remote locations, workers can come from anywhere.336 “Public policies have 
to work in partnership at international and national levels to create an 
ecosystem of AI that serves sustainable development.”337 The needs for 
digital literacy cannot be overstated. The key is to establish a set of 
competencies that will help meet the needs of employers in AI regardless of 
which countries they reside in.338 While there is disagreement on whether AI 
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will decrease jobs or increase jobs, if the U.S. does not take action to increase 
the digital literacy of its workforce, new jobs will be taken by those residing 
in other countries. 
Third, the lack of interoperability of 5G systems must be addressed with 
agreed-upon, worldwide standards for components and software.339 As 
explained, because some of Europe’s 4G systems rely on equipment 
provided by Chinese manufacturers whose components are not 
interchangeable with those made by Nokia and Eriksson, this creates a 
situation where one manufacturer can control the pace and location of 5G 
installation.340 It is in everyone’s interest to increase speed and reduce latency 
for AI implementation.341 As developing nations become more 
technologically advanced, new markets will open, which will buoy the 
economies of all three blocks.342 If China is able to set these standards for 5G 
due to its BRI tour, the EU will either need to match China’s standards or 
risk selling to a much smaller market. However, the situation is much worse 
for the U.S., as not only does it lack a major 5G equipment supplier, it is also 
dedicating a spectrum different from the rest of the world on which to build 
its infrastructure.343 
Fourth, countries must come together for the development and 
adherence to international ethical standards for the development of AI.344 




 339 See supra Section III.C, regarding lack of standards in 4G technology’s impact on cell phone use 
outside originating area. 
 340 Douwe Korff et al., Boundaries of Law: Exploring Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight 
of Government Surveillance Regimes (Univ. of Cambridge Fac. of Law, Research Paper No. 16/2017, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894490 [https://perma.cc/6JD9-EPLD]; DOLCERA, 5G NETWORK 
EQUIPMENT: HUAWEI VS. THE REST, AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT (Feb. 10, 2020), 
http://dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files3/362d3b7cafef6f15bfa0a17983cdf9a6.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9JK-A6K6]. 
 341 Self-driving cars, medical devices, smart homes, smart factories, IoT. Developing countries will 
be especially positively impacted by AI. Sameer Maskey, AI For Humanity: Using AI to Make a Positive 
Impact in Developing Countries, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/23/ai-for-humanity-using-ai-to-make-a-
positive-impact-in-developing-countries-2/#29619baf1b08 [https://perma.cc/8PF9-LJ9X]. 
 342 Oheneba Ama Nti Osei, The 5G Revolution Is Coming to Africa, AFRICA REP. (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:06 
PM), https://www.theafricareport.com/11461/the-5g-revolution-is-coming-to-africa/ 
[https://perma.cc/TZR7-RSH2]. 
 343 Scott Fulton III, How China, Brexit, and the US Derailed Global 5G Wireless, ZD NET (Aug. 16, 
2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-china-brexit-and-the-us-derailed-global-5g-
wireless/ [https://perma.cc/8L6K-HNRR]; see generally MEDIN & LOUIE, supra note 238, at 3–4. 
 344 In 2016, the Obama administration met with representatives from the European Parliament and 
the UK House of Commons to discuss AI and the “Good Society.” Corinne Cath et al., Artificial 
Intelligence and the ‘Good Society’: The US, EU, and UK Approach, 24 SCI ENG’G ETHICS 505 (2018). 
While the paper acknowledges the need to expand on these discussions, we seem to be moving away from 
international cooperation. 
18:129 (2021) Abandoning the AI ‘Race’ 
183 
making recommendations on AI Ethics.345 There are also a number of 
organizations and institutes making recommendations,346 but with the current 
lack of cooperation among nations, and the U.S. move away from the World 
Trade Organization, no binding regulations are being considered at this 
time.347 Most of the initiatives on AI ethics come from the private sector in 
both academia and industry.348 Racing to “win” at AI will circumvent this 
needed step. 
Fifth, the U.S. government needs to get up to date on technology. All 
three branches of the U.S. federal government are embarrassingly behind the 
times with respect to how technology works.349 Members of all branches have 
displayed stunning ignorance of the law as well, failing to understand the 
legislative framework and current limitations of privacy and data security 
law.350 While it is unlikely that a federal set of laws can be created, at the 
very least, the U.S. can incorporate minimal protections on consumer data 
and begin enforcing the laws to address the massive governmental collection 
of data, surveillance activities and lack of appropriate security measures.351 
The U.S.’s reliance on private industry to fund AI is bad policy.352 Steps must 
be taken to allocate spending on the responsible development of AI. The 
U.S.’s increasing military budgetary allocation is completely misplaced. All 
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the airplanes, aircraft carriers, bombs, and walls are no defense to future 
cyber warfare. Not only should funding be provided for commercial and 
social AI, but also for cyber-defense and detection.353 The U.S. military’s 
reliance on open source software and private industry has put them years, if 
not decades, behind China.354 While the U.S. complains of China’s firewall, 
it fails to acknowledge how it reduces access by bad actors.355 
Finally, the U.S. must open up midrange spectrum for 5G 
telecommunications and provide support for the build-out of the 
infrastructure for both urban and rural areas. The rural areas will be left out 
of the 5G revolution if they do not have access to the high speeds and low 
latency that 5G will provide. By operating in a different spectrum from the 
rest of the world, the U.S. risks creating components that are not marketable 
abroad. Additionally, relying on mmWaves will cost billions due to the 
density of installation required to address the lower range of data 
transmission that these waves provide. Because companies in the U.S. have 
sold over much of their telecommunication equipment manufacturers to 
foreign companies, this industry needs to be reinvigorated by investment 
from the U.S. government. In the short term, the U.S. needs to reconsider its 
position on sourcing hardware from China. The current restrictions do not 
enhance security but will drastically increase the cost and slow down the 
installation of the 5G infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
AI has the potential to spur efficiencies in just about every industry, 
improve medical diagnostics, reduce automobile fatalities, and address 
social inequality. As nations seek to compete with one another to win the so-
called race, they are actually delaying future developments in AI with their 
lack of cooperation. It is exceedingly dangerous to run without looking 
where you are going or at whom you might run over. Despite reports to the 
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contrary, we are at the very beginning of AI advancements, many of which 
cannot come to fruition until after transmission and processing speed is 
greatly increased and latency is reduced, as would be the case with 5G. 
Rather than trying to race one another, nations must be willing to 
acknowledge their interdependency, work together, and use their knowledge 
to create a worldwide set of standards and ethical framework by which to 
abide. The U.S. is especially at risk due to its failure of policy in supporting 
a 5G infrastructure. 
All three regions have advantages when it comes to AI. The EU has 
recently come out with a checklist for the ethical development of AI and is 
on the forefront of the responsible development of AI. The U.S. has the 
commercial framework due to private industry, with Silicon Valley and other 
rising tech hubs. Advances in semiconductors in the U.S. outpace any 
country in the world. China, on the other hand, has the advantage with a 
national strategy for AI, 5G networking equipment, and massive amounts of 
data, which has given it the lead in facial and voice recognition technology. 
The firms that create and commercialize 5G are at an advantage when it 
comes to setting standards. The U.S. has taken a wrong turn by hampering 
trade, banning 5G equipment, and designating the least useful spectrum for 
5G, which will not only harm the installation of its infrastructure, but will 
also prevent it from having a role in the future of 5G outside of the U.S. 
Standards must be agreed upon so that components are interchangeable and 
countries are not beholden to one supplier. 
Racing to win will prioritize speed over intentionality. Instead of AI for 
social good, AI could be created without safeguards or ethical 
considerations. Although the potential benefits are enormous, so are the 
risks. As the past has demonstrated, collaboration across borders increases 
technological progress, advancing all economies. It is also the right time to 
involve not just computer scientists and engineers, but also social scientists 
and legal ethicists, paying considerable attention to the diversity of those 
setting the standards and intentions for AI. What happens today with respect 
to AI will have a lasting worldwide effect on the future of our nations and 
society as a whole. Now is not the time to head off in different directions. 
Everyone will lose unless these nations realize the only way to win the race 
is together. 
